Russian strategy in the post-Soviet space: between soft and hard power. The case of Ukraine

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the USSR did not remain without negative consequences for the main heir of this empire: Russia. But after years of economic and political crises, Russia is raising its head and intends to regain its status as a great power.

Helped by economic development linked to oil and gas revenues (exports of its resources to Europe and Asia), Russia has launched a vast offensive since the beginning of the 2000s in order to regain its status as an indispensable ally with his “near stranger”. It is a question of restoring its zone of influence in the post-Soviet space. Central Asia, the Caucasus, Central Europe are all areas that need to be reconquered in order to preserve Russia's geostrategic interests. To be an international power, you have to be the leader in your own region. Ukraine is particularly an important area for Russia that must not be lost to Western forces. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO to this country would be seen as an invasion of Moscow's backyard and must therefore be avoided. The American researcher Zbigniew Brzezinski even considered that “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire”. To continue to play a political role in Europe, Russia needs to maintain its influence over this geopolitical pivot, and thus uses it as an anti-Western shield. As no one wants the area to be destabilized, the United States and Europe are kindly letting Russia recover its capacity for influence in Ukraine. This is demonstrated by the lack of will of the European Union and NATO to see the country join these two structures. Russian strategy in the post-Soviet space: between soft and hard power. The case of Ukraine To restore its capacity for influence in the post-Soviet space, two strategies are used by Moscow: soft and hard power. Russia has perfect control over hard power (a policy of aggressive coercion which results in military and economic actions), notably through the use of energy weapons (increase in the price of gas, threats to cut off supplies, etc.) , the multiplication of its military bases in the post-Soviet space, and even the outbreak of conflicts as we saw in the case of the war in Georgia, one of the reasons for which was the protection of Russian-speaking minorities. Seen from abroad, this hard power contradicts the desire displayed by Moscow since 2005 to rely on soft power as a strategy of influence, that is to say the capacity to “attract”, to be a pole of political, cultural and social attraction. The aim is to improve Russia's image abroad and to show that it is an essential interlocutor for dealing with international affairs. It was following the Orange Revolution of 2005 in Ukraine and the success of pro-Western forces that Moscow realized the capacity of soft power to produce positive effects. It was therefore from there that Moscow began to invest massively in this strategy of influence. But coexistence with ever-present hard power sows confusion and tends to diminish the positive effects of soft power on the international scene. Russian soft power, despite the low level of investment from which it suffers, compared to the sums spent by the United States and the European Union, is booming. Several instruments are at his disposal. The Russian language remains widely spoken in the post-Soviet space. In Ukraine, Russian is used as a vehicular language by 70% of the population. 60 % of the population is of Russian language and culture. Certain regions, such as the eastern region, are populated mainly by Russian settlers, established more or less long ago in the territory. Russia also uses the weapon of issuing Russian passports, particularly in Crimea. Around 180,000 people are said to have it in this region, dominated by Russian speakers. This massive delivery therefore increases support and sympathy for Russia within Ukrainian territory. The presence of Russian-speaking and Russophile populations in Ukraine tends to ensure that Russia faithfully relays its interests. Moscow has understood the importance of language as a lever of influence. It is increasing, across the post-Soviet space, lobbying campaigns in order to reinstate or maintain the teaching of Russian as a foreign language in school systems. Despite Ukrainian President Yanukovych's unfulfilled promises to make Russian the second official language of Ukraine, Moscow remains confident, and makes this clear through the voice of the vice-chairman of the Duma's international affairs committee, who announced that “Russian will be freely used in Ukraine, even if Ukrainian will remain the only official language of the country”. For him, the Russian-speaking population will stop being discriminated against, after 4 years of pro-Western government of Viktor Yushchenko. This statement from a parliamentarian is eloquent and as such shows Russia's capacity for political interference with its neighbor. ^[1] “Towards free use of the Russian language in Ukraine”, Ria Novosti, March 9, 2010. In Ukraine, the majority Orthodox Church claims to be from Moscow. This constitutes a very powerful channel of influence. Russia also uses the weapon of the media as an instrument in the service of soft power. According to Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean ^[2] “Russian soft power: discourse, tools, impact”, by Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, in Russia Nei Reports, 2010., “surveys conducted reveal that the CIS countries remain active consumers of Russian media products.” Thus, in Ukraine, more than ¾ of the population watches Russian television. Cyberspace (internet) is also well occupied by Russia. So, official national sites have Russian versions. Let us also add information agencies (like Ria Novosti), online newspapers, magazines which distribute information in more than 10 languages, including English. This proves Russian omnipresence in this media space. There are also no less than 47 books published in Russian on the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions and their consequences, with the main thesis being the desire to stop the expansion of the European Union. The information campaigns are aimed both inside and outside the country. Any event is exploited: the Russian victory at Eurovision in 2008, the Sochi Olympic Games in 2014, the presidency of the G8 in St. Petersburg, but also on themes such as historical memory. Higher education in Russia constitutes a formidable pole of attraction. Thousands of students from the post-Soviet space (they represent half of foreign students in Russia) come to study to become the future economic, political and military elites of their country. They will thus later be benevolent towards the country which trained them. Russia has also created Institutes, Funds and other Commissions which relay its interests within the post-Soviet space, with the general objective of improving the image of the country and promoting the Russian language and culture abroad. . Let us take as examples the Directorate for International and Cultural Cooperation with Foreign Countries, the new Federal Agency for CIS Affairs, the Russkij Mir Foundation, etc. Russia's involvement in regional political forums also reveals this desire to use soft power as a strategy of influence. But overall, the countries of the post-Soviet space remain wary, fearing that a new Russian imperialism will resurface in the face of the glaring asymmetry of relations with Moscow. Regional political and economic initiatives therefore meet with little success. Note that Moscow was able to brilliantly use soft power in Ukraine during the last presidential elections in 2012. Having learned the lessons of the Orange Revolution of 2005, Russia ensured a media, cultural and political presence which greatly helped in the election of the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych. For example, Russian MP Sergei Markov wasted no opportunity to explain to local media Russia's admiration for the Party of Regions candidate, even going so far as to glorify his past. Despite this offensive in terms of soft power, results are yet to come. We cannot, strictly speaking, see Ukraine moving into the Russian sphere of influence, despite the coming to power in 2010 of a pro-Russian government. Russia's image abroad remains generally negative, due in particular to the lack of democracy, the flouted freedom of the press, etc. Coexistence with hard power, particularly with regard to Ukraine, calls into question the progress made. In April 2010, Ukraine – with a new pro-Russian government – and Russia signed the agreement Kharkiv putting an end to incessant disputes over the question of Ukraine's energy supply. Until then, the entire decade has been marked by Russian maneuvers – which can be likened to hard power – around gas and oil supplies. For Ukraine, a country dependent on Russia to ensure its significant energy consumption, the numerous threats of price increases and cuts in deliveries amounted to real declarations of war and plunged the country into major crises. Questions of gas transit and purchase have therefore occupied national news for many years. At the same time, Ukraine had a way to counterbalance Russian power: leasing its port of Sevastopol in Crimea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, thus offering Moscow a strategic position of choice. Ukraine had previously decided not to renew the lease beyond 2014. The agreement reached satisfied both parties: the lease is extended until 2042, in exchange for which the energy supply is assured with a rebate of 30 %. This decision was not popularly received in Ukraine. The continuation of the Russian military presence on Ukrainian territory is in fact seen as an act of high treason by the country's opposition and is assimilated to a true act of hard power. The vote on this provision in the kyiv Parliament was also ratified with clashes between parliamentarians. For pro-Westerners, it is indeed a real step backwards to let Russia modernize its infrastructure in this area of the Black Sea, and thus establish itself permanently, directly threatening to continue to interfere in the internal affairs of the 'Ukraine. On the scale of the post-Soviet space, the presence of military bases, military cooperation, military training, technical assistance and joint maneuvers remain means of hard power used by Moscow to ensure its influence. The strong growth in its resources linked to the increase in investments makes it an essential player and partner for all the new independent republics. These collaborations are most often done bilaterally but also via regional forums. Alongside the energy sector, Russia also began a massive invasion of Ukraine's strategic economic sectors in the 2000s. Thus, investments multiplied first between 2002 and 2004 (they were tripled) and then especially from 2005 (after the Orange Revolution following which Russia became aware of the need to develop its soft power ) in the banking and financial sectors (10 % owned by Russians), the metallurgical and arms industry, telecommunications, transport, aeronautics, aerospace, shipyards, nuclear power, infrastructure energy, chemistry etc. Russia therefore uses its economic power – an instrument that is likened to hard power – to extend its influence in Ukraine. In 2008, there were more than $1,800 million in Russian investments in Ukraine. Russia controls 70 % of commercial shipbuilding and 60 % of military shipbuilding. Furthermore, Ukrainian indebtedness to Russian banks also constitutes an important lever of action available to Moscow. By signing the Kharkiv Agreement, a broader rapprochement program was approved, paving the way for multiple Russian-Ukrainian mergers through mixed capital companies in these strategic sectors. However, this penetration of the Ukrainian market by its neighbor must be qualified. The European Union is increasingly present, and constitutes a significant pole of attraction which is stopping Ukraine from ceding all its heritage to Russia. Finally, we can postulate that despite some progress and a certain regained influence within its “near abroad”, Russia is struggling to see its soft power triumph. Often compared to propaganda, it is in fact poorly received abroad and therefore suffers from its inadequacy to local realities. The Russian state is omnipresent behind every initiative and casts doubt, suggesting a new form of hidden imperialism. Besides this, Ukraine's attachment to continuing its hard power undermines the efforts undertaken. But even if Russia continues, via the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, to ensure a strong military presence, the power seems to rule out the use of armed interventions. A chance to see soft power emerge as the only part of Russian foreign policy, to the detriment of hard power? Soft power, less direct, would therefore be no less effective, if it is carried out with greater coordination and coherence. Faced with Russia's awakening on the international level, the European Union must be careful not to marginalize this emerging power, otherwise it would generate great frustrations synonymous with conflicts. Thus, we can only applaud the strategic dialogue between NATO and Russia which guarantees peace by ensuring a constant dialogue on the future in the post-Soviet space. The European Union must also be careful not to offend Russia and as such must continue to keep Ukraine out of NATO and the Union. Indeed, a shift of this country into the Western camp would sound like a real disavowal for Russia and would tend to build a perception of threat in Moscow. To avoid any future conflict between great powers in Central Europe, the European Union must therefore be able to let Russia continue to work to regain its influence within the post-Soviet space. Thanks to the international action of the European Union which is essentially based on soft power, Russia could be tempted to abandon its hard power in favor of soft power. A solid guarantee of peace while maintaining Russian power at the height of its ambitions? Santiago Fischer

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